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1 Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed a massive increase in cross-border capital ows, fol-
lowing the rapid decline in capital controls that occurred in industrial countries in the 1980s
and in developing countries since the early 1990s. During that period, international capital
transactions between countries rose from about 5% of world GDP to over 20%. Intensi-
cation of the nancial globalization (FG) process has inevitably drawn the attention of
economists and policymakers on the actual macroeconomic implications of unfettered cap-
ital ows. In particular, their real benets for long-term economic growth remain highly
controversial (Obstfeld, 2009). Although capital ows are presumably benecial for receiv-
ing countries as they gain access to cheaper nancing, the history of international nancial
integration (IFI) has not been inherently smooth nor risk-free. In the context of developing
countries, surges in capital inows can pose critical challenges such as strong currency ap-
preciation pressures, asset price bubbles or rapid credit growth that induce fragilities in the
nancial sector. The nancial crises of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and Southeast
Asian also sorely illustrated the disrupting eects of large swings in capital ows. More
recently, the nancial turmoil undergone by developed countries has led economists to adopt
an even more wary stance towards nancial globalization. The dierence, this time, was that
the crisis originated in the mature nancial systems of rich economies, considered before as
highly resilient, and emphasized the vulnerabilities of the international monetary and nan-
cial system as a whole. True also, the phenomenon of global current account imbalances -
with capital owing \uphill" from emerging markets and oil-exporting countries to the de-
veloped world, especially the US - played a major role in laying the conditions for the crisis.
Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) observe that: \it does not seem to matter how capital ows.
That it ows in suciently large quantities across borders - the celebrated phenomenon of
nancial globalization - seems to spell trouble", and recommend that international ows of
capital should be curbed. Against this backdrop, even the International Monetary Fund has
recently endorsed the legitimacy of capital controls as a part of a policy toolkit to help coun-
tries manage large inows of capital (see Ostry et al., 2011; Moghadam, 2011). Although
the institution remains a fervent advocate of the positive role of international nance in
promoting global economic eciency, it increasingly recognizes that the process of nancial
globalization bears potential adverse eects if let go adrift.
On research ground, neither the theoretical nor the empirical studies could provide a
consensus to reconcile the controversy over the desirability of liberalizing capital ows. On
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one hand, standard neoclassical theory asserts that gains from IFI are straightforward and
work mainly through three channels to stimulate growth. First, IFI improves global allocative
eciency as it allows nancial resources to ow to their most productive uses. Specically,
it can provide capital-scarce countries with the resources they need to grow faster. Second,
IFI facilitates international risk-sharing and risk-diversication across countries, leading to a
re-composition of portfolio in favor of riskier assets oering higher returns (Obstfeld, 1994).
Moreover, it helps promoting domestic nancial development (Levine, 2001): for instance,
IFI enhances stock market liquidity and the presence of foreign banks tends to improve the
functioning of the domestic banking system and the provision of nancial services (see also
Levine, 1996; Klein and Olivei, 2008).
On the other hand, second-best theories predict that eliminating the distorting eects of
capital controls may actually amplify the negative eects of other pre-existing distortions,
resulting in welfare loss. Martin and Rey (2006) show that the propensity of nancial crash
is higher in economies which liberalize trade in nancial assets before trade in goods. Stiglitz
(2000) argues that information asymmetries are intrinsic to nancial transactions, and views
IFI as hazardous and potentially exacerbating problems of bad resource allocations and
excessive borrowings. Ju and Wei (2007) nd that institutions aect the patterns of interna-
tional capital ows: weak domestic institutions, especially weak property rights, can reduce
the prot opportunities of both domestic and foreign rms. Thus, some theories suggest the
existence of pre-requisites conditioning the gains from IFI and the need to sequence reforms
when devising growth strategies (McKinnon, 1991).
Like theoretical studies, the vast empirical literature fails to provides robust evidence
of a positive link between IFI and economic development either.1 Moreover, recent studies
tend to emphasize the negative correlation between capital ows and economic growth,
either by showing that countries grow more rapidly when they rely less on external nancing
(Prasad et al., 2007), or by observing that foreign capital tend to ow, paradoxically, to
countries with low productivity growth (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007). Concurrently, there
has been a revival of the threshold research agenda, with the aim to rationalize the potential
benets of IFI. Kose et al. (2006), for instance, maintain that \various threshold eects
play an important role in shaping the macroeconomic outcomes of nancial globalization".
However, empirical evidence have so far yielded conicting conclusions. Edison et al. (2002)
1Prasad et al. (2003); Rogo et al. (2004); Kose et al. (2006, 2009) provide detailed reviews of the em-
pirical literature.
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nd some evidence that IFI interact with institutional factors, but not with the degree
of nancial development or macroeconomic policies. In contrast, Kose et al. (2010) stress
the key role of domestic nancial development in improving the cost-benets trade-o from
capital ows.
This paper re-examines the IFI-growth nexus, focusing on the presence of contingency
eects in the relationship. The dierence from previous nancial globalization literature lies
in the use of non-linear panel estimation techniques. To our best knowledge, this paper is
the rst to apply panel threshold regression (PTR) model, developed by Hansen (1999), to
assess the relationship between IFI and economic growth, using various and complemen-
tary indicators of nancial integration. This empirical strategy allows us to investigate the
threshold eects of the IFI-growth link in a more adequate and exible way than previous
studies. First, the PTR methodology provides endogenous identication of threshold levels,
which we believe may bring new insights into the issue compared to ad hoc methods of
sample-splitting or linear modeling with interaction terms. Second, it allows to determine
whether the threshold eect is statistically signicant and the non-linear specication vali-
dated. The alternative variables selected as threshold are country characteristics deemed to
be pre-requisites allowing IFI to be growth-enhancing.
We nd evidence that countries capable of reaping the benets of IFI satisfy certain
threshold conditions in these variables. In particular, the level of institutional and nancial
development, and the pace of ination appear as signicant thresholds. Our results also
reveal a dierentiated behavior of foreign direct investment and portfolio liabilities compared
to debt liabilities.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset and detail (i)
how we measure IFI, and (ii) the choice of threshold variables. In section 3, the empirical
methodology, consisting in a panel threshold regression (PTR) model, is presented. Results
are discussed in section 4; and the nal section concludes.
2 Data and measurement issues
Our empirical study is based on a standard growth regression model, as traditionally imple-
mented in the literature (e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2003). We build an annual panel
dataset consisting of 80 countries observed over the 1984-2007 period. The dependent
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variable is the real per capita GDP growth.2 Control variables are selected in accordance
with robustness results highlighted in inuential past studies (e.g., Levine and Renelt, 1992;
Sala-I-Martin, 1997; Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004). They include the initial income - to control
for conditional convergence -, a proxy for the initial stock of human capital, the investment
rate, and the growth rate of population. We also test an alternative specication where, be-
sides the initial conditions, we control for macroeconomic policies by including government
spending (expressed as a ratio of GDP) and ination. The underlying motivation is derived
from endogenous growth theory, which enables economic policies to have permanent eects
on economic growth (Easterly, 2005).
Starting with one of these baseline models, we adopt a sequential strategy and run suc-
cessive regressions, using both dierent IFI indicators and alternative threshold variables
(one equation is estimated for each pair of IFI indicator and threshold). In what follows, we
justify our approach to select IFI and threshold variables, and discuss some key conceptual
and measurement issues.
2.1 Data on international nancial integration
2.1.1 Measuring IFI
The empirical literature has been inexorably confronted with the diculty of identifying and
measuring nancial integration in a consistent manner, both over time and across countries
(Edison et al., 2004). The dierent approaches considered so far have brought about two
main types of indicators with dierent informational contents.
De jure indicators place an emphasis on government policies and identify the presence
of regulatory measures restricting capital account transactions. They are designed using
ocial information reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), or, in some cases, the data contained in the OECD's
Code of Liberalization of Capital Movement. The basic de jure measure is a simple binary
variable indicating the years where some kind of capital controls were active. Quinn (1997),
Montiel and Reinhart (1999), Miniane (2004), Magud and Reinhart (2007), Chinn and Ito
(2008) and Schindler (2009) developed methodologies beyond this on/o indicator and pro-
posed more informative and disaggregated measures.
De facto indicators dier from the latter in that they intend to assess a country's actual
2See Appendix Table A.2 for data description and sources.
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exposure to international capital ows. These quantitative indicators, based on the direct
observation of existing types of cross-border transactions, are therefore likely to be more
objective and less prone to measurement errors than rule-based indicators. Empirical appli-
cations examining the macroeconomic implications of nancial integration have commonly
used either gross measures of capital inows and outows, or stock measures of foreign assets
and liabilities accumulated over time.
In this paper, we chose to rely on the second aspect of nancial openness because de jure
indicators have several well-known drawbacks that make them unsuitable for our analysis.
First of all, these indicators tend to be highly persistent, while our panel threshold approach
rules out the possibility of using variables that are time invariant. Secondly, measures of
legal restrictions may not reliably reect actual nancial openness. Some authors have, for
instance, highlighted the fact that de jure indicators are poorly correlated to the amount
of external nancing received in developing countries (e.g. Prasad et al., 2003; Edison et al.,
2004; Edwards, 2007); this reveals the usual limited capacity of governments to enforce capi-
tal controls eectively. Certain types of restrictions may inuence the composition of capital
ows (Edwards, 1999; Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Magud and Reinhart, 2007; Binici et al.,
2010), yet their eect on volumes remains debatable. In any case, de jure indicators fail to
capture accurately the intensity and ecacy of government restrictions.
Hence, for the purpose of our analysis, it seems more relevant to focus on de facto
nancial openness; arguably, the theoretical growth-benets will hinge on the amount of
capital ows experienced by a country. One major shortcoming, however, is that de facto
measures may be aected by the same range of factors inuencing economic growth - such
as macroeconomic policies or political circumstances -, while growth outcomes may, in turn,
drive capital ows (Eichengreen, 2001). Therefore, we will have to account explicitly for this
potential endogeneity bias in assessing the growth-IFI relationship.3
We examine four measures of nancial integration drawn from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007)' database. These authors computed the accumulated stocks of foreign assets and
liabilities for an extensive sample of countries. Their data provide more accurate IFI in-
dicators than capital ow measures at least for two reasons: (i) stock measures are gen-
erally less sensitive to short-run factors and, thus, less volatile than ow measures; (ii)
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) also carefully corrected the gross stocks for price and ex-
3De jure measures are not completely exogenous either as capital controls tend to be imposed by weak
government. See Eichengreen (2001) for a discussion.
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change rate uctuations. We consider both the sum of total stocks of external assets and
liabilities (as a share of GDP) and the total stocks of liabilities. In order to account for a
potential composition eect, we also break down the accumulated stocks of liabilities into
FDI plus portfolio equity liabilities, and debt liabilities.
2.1.2 Trends in IFI and stylized facts
Even though nancial globalization appears as one of the most irresistible phenomena of
our days, it remains unevenly spread among countries and its benets for growth are hard
to detect in the data. Figure 1 pictures the evolution of the dierent measures of IFI in
countries grouped into industrial (23), emerging (20) and other developing countries (37).4
Figure 2 presents the simple correlations between economic growth and IFI. The period
covered is 1984-2007. Several key points emerge from these gures.
First, industrial countries are, by all measures, the most nancially opened and receive
the lion's share of cross-border capital ows. As shown in Figure 1, Panel (a), their average
total stocks of external assets and liabilities rose dramatically from 80% of GDP in 1984 to
over 400% in 2007. Panel (b) also indicates that these countries are by far the most important
recipient of external nancing. Comparing Panel (c) and Panel (d) reveals, however, that the
composition of inward capital ows has been strongly biased towards debt liabilities, which
represent on average 130% of industrial countries' GDP in 2007, while FDI and portfolio
equity liabilities add up to only 65% of GDP.
Second, the progression of de facto nancial integration has been more contained in
emerging and other developing countries. These economies also exhibit a very dierent
pattern of capital ows compared to rich economies. Indeed, Figure 1, Panel (b) and Panel
(c) show that they have relied relatively more on FDI and portfolio equity ows and reduced
gradually their amount of debt liabilities in recent years. This suggests the importance of
examining various components of capital ows when assessing the growth-impact of IFI.
Finally, emerging economies have attracted more FDI and portfolio equity investments, on
average, than other developing economies. However, with a ratio of FDI and portfolio equity
inows to GDP of 40%, they still fall far behind industrial countries.
Third, in Figure 2, Panel (a) and Panel (b), where IFI is captured by the two more
aggregated indicators - namely, total stocks and total liabilities -, its correlation with real
per capita GDP growth turns out to be rather weak. However, there is a more apparent
4Appendix Table A.1 details the country sample.
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Figure 2: IFI-growth correlations
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relationship between growth and subcomponents of capital ows. Panel (c) shows that FDI
and portfolio equity liabilities are positively related to growth, while Panel (d) indicates a
negative association between debts and growth. Once again, Figure 2 highlights the value
of considering the dierent nature of capital ows. In this study, we intend to elicit further
the great heterogeneity observed among countries by combining this composition of ow
hypothesis with the determination of threshold eects.
2.2 Data on threshold variables
This paper examines the existence of contingency eects in the IFI-growth relationship and
assesses whether it is potentially intermediated by some third factors. These factors are
country characteristics that, as suggested by some economic theories and emerging evidence,
work as pre-requisites for IFI to be growth-promoting.5 In particular, we look at the level of
income, the degree of trade openness, the quality of the institutional setting, the soundness of
macroeconomic policies and the level of nancial development. Kose et al. (2010) summarize
these variables inuencing the IFI-growth nexus as a set of \threshold" conditions.
We begin by investigating the IFI-growth relationship in dierent country income groups.
The succession of crises experienced by emerging countries in the 1990s has given reasons
to think that the eects of capital account liberalization may vary with domestic struc-
tural conditions, such as the level of nancial and institutional development. While these
characteristics are often dicult to capture and disentangle, they are generally considered
better developed in high-income countries. Therefore, some authors have proposed to assess
how a country's overall level of economic development interacts with its degree of nancial
openness. Their results provide mixed evidence.
On the one hand, Alesina et al. (1993) nd evidence of a small positive association be-
tween capital account liberalization and growth with a sample of 20 high-income countries,
while Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) nd a negative link in a sample dominated by de-
veloping countries. Considering a broader cross-country dataset including six regions and
more than 400 countries in the world, Edwards (2001) nds opposite and signicant eects
of capital account liberalization on growth in high and low-income countries, although the
signicance of his results are sensitive to the choice of indicator for capital account openness.
5Some authors focus on the absorptive capacity of host countries, which could be aected by these
pre-conditions, to explain the weak or scant evidence of FDI-growth relationship (see Crespo and Fontoura
(2007) for a survey of this branch of literature.).
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On the other hand, Arteta et al. (2001) only report scant evidence of a stronger growth-eect
in high-income countries. Relying on the results of a counter-factual study assuming that the
Great Depression did not take place, Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) infer that freer capital
mobility in the wake of World War II would have had little eect on economic growth in
advanced industrial countries, but that it would have permitted a more ecient allocation
of resources in the developing world, accelerating at least slightly the process of economic
growth and development there. Here, rather than dividing our sample into high-income and
low-income countries or including a dummy variable interacted with IFI, we use the initial
income, measured by the lagged value of logarithm of real per capita GDP, as a threshold
variable.
The degree of nancial openness as well as the eect of IFI on growth may also depend
on a country's degree of trade openness. On the one hand, Aizenman (2008) argue that
trade opening will inevitably lead to nancial opening due, notably, to a public nance
linkage between them. Aizenman and Noy (2009) investigate the relative magnitudes in the
directions of causality between trade and nancial openness and conclude that in an era of
rapidly growing trade integration, countries cannot choose nancial openness independently
of their degree of trade integration. One the other hand, nancial integration without trade
openness could lead to a misallocation of resources when foreign capital ows into non-
competitive domestic industries (Brecher and Alejandro, 1977). Here we use trade openness
as one of the pre-conditions and rely on a conventional indicator, which equals the sum
of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP. As in the case of nancial
openness, de jure indicators have also been developed to measure trade openness policy
(Wacziarg and Welch, 2008), but, once again, they are less informative and time-variant
than indicators of de facto trade openness.6
Not only have institutions been argued as a fundamental source of long run growth
(Acemoglu et al., 2003), they are also assumed to inuence economic outcomes by providing
the right incentives for a country to allocate resources eciently. Moreover, economists
have especially emphasized the importance of institutional arrangements that establish the
security of private property, the enforceability of contracts and an eective legal system
(Mishkin, 2008), all of which could aect the role of IFI on economic growth. However,
6See, e.g., Barro and Lee (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999) for this kind of
binary index. To measure the trade integration, Bachellerie et al. (2010) group 58 countries using the major
existing regional trade agreements (RTAs), which cover various degrees (\steps") of the Balassa (1961)s
classication of economic integration.
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institutional features (or quality) are the most complex variables to quantify. In this paper
we rely on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database to derive a proxy for the
quality of institutions because it provides the most complete database available with the
longest time span.7 The political risk rating monitored in ICRG covers fundamental aspects
of institutional quality such as law and order, corruption, the quality of the bureaucracy,
government stability, democratic accountability, investment conditions and socio-economic
context. We construct a composite index (a simple annual average) of ve political risk
components: corruption, democratic accountability, investment conditions, law and order,
and socio-economic context. This index ranges from 0 to 58, with higher values indicating
better institutional quality. These data are available on an annual basis starting from 1984.8
Literature on reform sequencing underscores the importance of achieving macroeconomic
stability and strengthening domestic nancial institutions before liberalizing capital markets
(Echeverria et al., 1997). Macroeconomic policies aimed at preserving sustainable macroe-
conomic balance may be necessary to avoid sharp reversals in capital inows (sudden stops)
which increase the risk of crisis. Using the black market premium as an indicator of macroe-
conomic imbalances, Arteta et al. (2001) report evidence of threshold eects of nancial
openness on the growth, which depend on macroeconomic policies. However, few empirical
studies (see, e.g., Edison et al., 2002; Kose et al., 2010) look at the role of monetary and
scal policies in generating the contingency eects of IFI on the growth. In order to asses
the relevance of macroeconomic policies, we introduce as threshold variables the ratio of
government expenditure to GDP (proxy for scal policy) and the ination rate calculated as
the logarithmic rst dierence of the consumer price index (proxy for monetary policy).9
Some authors maintain that capital ows are determined by the eciency of a coun-
try's nancial sector. Potential benets derived from nancial integration, in the context of
emerging and developing countries, will thus depend on the advancement of their nancial
systems. Using a model with domestic and international borrowing constraints, Aoki et al.
(2006) show that capital account liberalization is not necessarily benecial when the domes-
7Other existing indicators of institutional quality include Hall-Jones index (Hall and Jones, 1999), the
index of economic freedom of Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al., 2006) and the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI).
8Arteta et al. (2001) took the index of law and order of this database as the proxy of institutional
strength; Chinn and Ito (2007) use this database to assess the eect of legal and institutional environment
development.
9We follow Edison et al. (2002) and calculate ination using consumer price index, while Kose et al.
(2010) use the rst dierence of ination as the measure of monetary policy.
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tic nancial system is underdeveloped.10 In the empirical literature, one common practice
for measuring nancial development is to focus on nancial depth and compute the size of
the formal intermediary sector relative to the size of the economy. Our proxy for nancial
depth equals the ratio of private credit (claims on the non nancial private sector) to GDP.
We are aware that this is a narrow measure which only partially reects the level of nancial
development in an economy as it does not account for nancial services provided outside the
banking system, i.e. on nancial markets. There are two reasons for focusing on the banking
sector to investigate the role of nancial development (Azman-Saini et al., 2010): rst, bank
credits are the only feasible sources of nancing for the majority of developing countries in
our sample; second, the number of available observations for equity market indicators are
insucient to conduct panel threshold regression.
3 Panel threshold regression (PTR) model
This study is based on the assumption that IFI will impact growth in a nonlinear way. We
follow the methodology developed by Hansen (1999) to test for the existence of threshold
eects in the growth-IFI relationship. First considering one potential threshold, the PTR
model takes the form:
yit = i + 
0
1xitI(qit  ) + 
0
2xitI(qit > ) + eit (1)
where the subscript i indexes the individual and the subscript t indexes the time period.
The dependent variable yit is regressed on an individual-specic xed eect i, and a vector
of controls xit, which slope coecients switch between regimes depending on the value of an
observable variable qit. The indicator function, I(:), which equals 0 when qit is below the
threshold parameter  and 1 in the other case, generates an abrupt transition mechanism
between two extreme regimes. An alternative way to present this mechanism is to write:
yit =
(
i + 
0
1xit + eit qit  ;
i + 
0
2xit + eit qit > :
(2)
In this specication, observations fall into two discrete classes and respond to distinct re-
gression functions, where the vector of slope parameters is either 1 or 2. The PTR model
10Because total factor productivity stagnates in the long-run or employment decreases in the short-run.
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provides an homogeneous transition mechanism for all the individuals in the sample but still
allows each of them to switch between regimes, depending on the threshold condition that is
satised at a given date. In this way, the PTR approach solves the heterogeneity and time
variability issues by allowing the model parameters to vary both across individuals and over
time.
The main appeal of the PTR methodology lies, however, in the endogenous determination
of the threshold value. Hansen (1999) proposed a sequential procedure for estimating the
threshold parameter. After a rst preliminary step consisting in removing the individual-
specic eects, equation (1) is successively estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with
all possible values of .11 The least square estimate of the threshold parameter ^ is then
selected as to minimize the sum of squared residuals obtained previously. Once ^ is identied,
the slope coecient estimates are simply ^1(^) and ^2(^), yielded from OLS estimations in
each regime separated by ^. In other words, the PTR model is a piece-wise linear one.
The nal issue to be addressed is the statistical signicance of the estimated threshold
parameter. Since  is not identied under the null hypothesis of no threshold, Hansen (1999)
suggests a non-standard inference strategy based on bootstrap simulations of the asymptotic
distribution of the likelihood ratio test.12
The methodology can be generalized to account for multiple thresholds. In our analysis,
we start by considering the following double-threshold regression model with three potential
regimes:
GROWTHit = i +X
0
it + 1IFIi;t 1I(qit  1) + 2IFIi;t 1I(1 < qit  2) (3)
+3IFIi;t 1I(2 < qit) + eit
where the dependent variable, GROWTH, is the change in real per capital GDP (in log).
We use the lag of the IFI indicator to circumvent the potential reverse causality problem
posed by this variable.13 In equation (3), only the slope coecient on IFIi;t 1 switches
11In practice, the search over values of  may be limited to specic quantiles. It is also recommended
to eliminate a minimum percentage of extreme values to ensure that the results are not driven by potential
outliers.
12The properties and validity of this bootstrap procedure are also discussed in Hansen (1996) and Hansen
(2000).
13Besides, some authors argue that non-linear modeling strategies can mitigate endogeneity issues
(Bereau et al., 2011; Omay and znur Kan, 2010; Fouqau, 2008). Arguably, our threshold model captures
the contrasting growth eects of IFI at dierent levels of the threshold variable and reduces the potential
endogeneity bias in the same way as the presence of interaction terms in a linear model (see Aghion et al.,
2009).
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between regimes depending on the value of an observable threshold variable qit, while the
slope coecients on the other controls, Xit, are constrained to remain invariant.
14 In this
way, we isolate the variable of interest and concentrate the analysis on the contingency eects
in the IFI-growth relationship. The growth-enhancing - or debasing - eects of IFI will vary
with the threshold condition.
4 Empirical results
Equation (3) is estimated for each selected threshold variable and measure of IFI. As we
focus on long term growth, a timespan of twenty-four years seems suciently large to char-
acterize the long period, taking into account the data availability. Empirical studies dealing
with growth regressions have traditionally averaged observations over xed-length intervals
(typically, 3 or 5-years intervals) to eliminate business-cycle uctuations. However, while
averaging clearly induces a loss of information, it is not obvious that ad hoc methods of
period averaging eectively remove cyclical eects. In order to save useful information to
implement a more exible model that allows for some parameter heterogeneity, we estimate
the PTR with annual data.15
The regressions results are shown in Table 1 to Table 6. For each selected threshold vari-
able, we report in columns [1] the estimation results associated with the dierent measures
of IFI.16 The upper panels in Table 1 to Table 6 show the coecients and test statistics for
the growth determinants, and the inferior panels display the threshold estimates along with
their condence intervals, test statistics and bootstrap pvalues. For robustness checks,17 we
also run regressions where we include the threshold variable among the initial explanatory
variables and report the results in columns [2] of Tables 2 to 6. The underlying motivation
is that the variable used as threshold may, in fact, also have a eect on growth - besides the
14Restricting the coecients of some variables to be constant has no eect on the asymptotic distribution
theory for threshold parameters and regression slopes (Hansen, 1999).
15For instance, Khan and Senhadji (2001); Omay and znur Kan (2010); Lopez-Villavicencio and Mignon
(2011) use annual data to study the non-linearities in the relationship between growth and ination.
Bereau et al. (2011) assess the non-linear growth eects of currency misalignments.
16We did not report the results for the alternative regression model where we controlled directly for
government spending and ination as the estimated coecients were unstable across dierent IFI indicators.
17Another robustness check consisted in changing the trimming parameters from 10% to 5 or 15%. Only
the threshold estimate for institutions, in the regression using the measure of total stocks, was slightly
aected. Since we obtained the same estimates for the slope parameters and threshold variable in all the
remaining cases, we did not report the results.
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threshold eect -, and not controlling explicitly for it may aect the results.18
First, consistent with the conditional convergence hypothesis, we nd a negative coe-
cient for the initial income. The other explanatory variables also have the expected signs.
As predicted by theory, human capital and investment facilitate growth, whereas population
growth has the opposite - although not signicant - eect.
Second, in every estimated regressions, we nd at most a single threshold in the condi-
tioning variables - i.e. the null hypothesis of a single threshold cannot be rejected at 5%
signicance level.19 Interestingly, the results highlight the existence of a composition eect
in capital ows: the threshold estimates vary signicantly across the four measures of IFI,
irrespective of the conditioning variable considered. Like in similar previous studies (e.g.
Edwards, 2001; Edison et al., 2002; Kose et al., 2010), the estimated coecients on IFI tend
to be smaller (in absolute terms) than the ones on core growth determinants. As capital
accumulation is a major channel through which IFI increases growth, controlling directly
for the volume of domestic investment in the regressions should logically result in lowering
the estimated impact of IFI. Moreover, the fact that FDI and portfolio liabilities are found
to have larger growth-enhancing eects suggests, indirectly, that the channel of inuence
for FDI eect on growth may also be through transfers of technology and knowledge, and
eciency gains (Borensztein et al., 1998). This also seems to support the hypothesis that
capital ows exhibit dierent properties.
In Table 1, the results for the tests of threshold indicate that the income level inuences
the relationship between IFI and growth in half the cases. The threshold values obtained
endogenously with the PTR modeling approach are 8.2 (i.e. about 3600 US dollars) when
we measure IFI as the stock of total liabilities, and 10.2 (26,000 US dollar) when we use FDI
plus portfolio equity liabilities. The associated bootstrap p-values are respectively 0.06 and
0.04. By contrast, non-linearity is rejected for total stocks and debt liabilities. The PTR
model implies asymmetric responses of output growth to IFI when it takes the form of total
liabilities. In the lower regime, where income level is below the estimated threshold, IFI
has a negative and signicant eect on growth; and in the higher regime, its eect becomes
signicantly positive. The results obtained with FDI and portfolio equity liabilities are
markedly dierent. While the estimated threshold of income level is much higher than in the
18In various studies, threshold values tend to decrease signicantly as new explanatory variables are
introduces (Omay and znur Kan, 2010)
19In Appendix gure A.1, we report how the panel observation are distributed relative to the estimated
thresholds
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precedent case, the slope coecient on IFI, measured by FDI plus portfolio equity liabilities,
is always positive and signicant. However, it decreases when we move from the low to
the high regime. From the viewpoint of the receiving economy, this means that external
liabilities are all the more benecial than they are composed of FDI and portfolio equities,
although the marginal gains in terms of output growth will decrease as the economy catches
up with rich countries.
In Table 2, two specications are tested for each IFI indicator. In model [1], where
trade openness is introduced only as the threshold variable, the results show the existence
of two dierentiated regimes for all measures of IFI, except for FDI and portfolio liabilities.
The threshold estimates indicate a trade openness ratio of 67 to 69% of GDP. Below this
threshold value, IFI has a negative impact on growth, although it is signicant only for debt
liabilities. Once the trade openness ratio rises above the estimated threshold, the coecient
on IFI becomes positive and signicant. In model [2], we include trade openness in the set
of explanatory variables and observe that, in most cases, this change of specication does
not modify the threshold estimates and only marginally alters the slope coecients in the
dierent regimes. However, the results for the tests of threshold are severely aected as none
of the threshold estimates is now found signicant. Thus, we do not nd evidence that trade
integration is a pre-requisite for nancial integration.
Evidence from Table 3 strongly points to a sample-split based on the quality of insti-
tutions. Interestingly, the institutional quality threshold interacts homogeneously with the
stock measures of total assets plus liabilities, total liabilities and debt liabilities. For these
three IFI indicators, the results show a positive and signicant eect of IFI conditioned by
a threshold value of 18.4 in the institutional quality index. This seem to conrm that good
institutions are fundamental to provide the right incentives so that external nancial re-
sources can generate social value and be earmarked to high-protability projects. However,
when moving to specication [2], the signicance of the threshold estimate only holds for the
measure of debt liabilities. Finally, worth noticing is the dierentiated behavior of FDI and
portfolio equity liabilities compared to the others IFI indicators. Indeed, FDI & portfolio
investments brings higher growth-benets to more institutionally challenged countries, and
overall, their positive eects are larger than for the other types of capital ows.
In Table 4, we test the relevance of nancial development as a threshold in the IFI-growth
relationship. Threshold estimates are found signicant in regressions using the stock of total
assets and liabilities, and the stock of FDI plus portfolio equity liabilities; these values equal
17
45.7% and 47.2%, respectively, and remain invariant when private credit enters the set of
controls. The results also suggest that, while IFI is positively related to growth, an increase
in IFI leads to higher additional output growth in nancially under-developed economies
relative to nancially developed ones. Thus, contrary to some theories and past empirical
studies, we do not nd evidence that a well-functioning nancial system is crucial in the
IFI-growth nexus. The 2007-2009 nancial turmoil shows that the level of nancial depth
seems more immaterial than complementary to the nancial globalization process.
Finally, we nd that sound macroeconomic policies also play a role in conditioning the
direct benets of IFI. However, maintaining a low ination appears more important than
containing government spending. In Table 5, practically all the tests of threshold conclude in
favor of a non-linear relationship between IFI and growth, although the condence intervals
are sometimes too large for policy relevance. This time, FDI and portfolio equity liabilities
exhibit the same asymmetric dynamics as the other IFI measures; in low ination regime, IFI
has a positive growth eect, whereas in high ination regime, this eect becomes negative -
although not signicant in most cases. By contrast, non-linearity is strongly rejected when
the level of government spending is used as a threshold variable (Table 6).
5 Concluding Remarks
Relying on non-linear panel techniques, we estimate the relationship between IFI and eco-
nomic growth and provide new evidence that nancial integration could facilitate economic
growth in countries satisfying certain threshold conditions, regarding institutional quality,
private credit, ination, and to a lesser extent trade openness. Moreover, we were able to
determine these threshold levels endogenously by taking advantage of the PTR modeling
approach and test the validity of the non-linear structure of the IFI-growth relationship.
Previous studies do not permit to establish such conclusions. In sum, the PTR methodology
oers a strategy to deal with the cross-country heterogeneity regarding their experience with
capital ows and allows to isolate the particular conditions under which IFI is statistically
related to economic growth. However, one limit we see in the PTR approach is that it does
not permit to investigate how one threshold condition can substitute to another. So far, we
do not have knowledge of studies examining this question. Finally, our results also point
to the existence of a composition eect in capital ows: (i) threshold values vary across
dierent measures of IFI; (ii) debt inows induce an asymmetric response of output growth
18
compared to FDI inows which impact remains positive but decreases from low regimes to
high regimes.
Since the benecial eects of nancial integration for a country depend on the prior
development of third economic and social characteristics, a haste nancial liberalization
without considering these pre-requisites will bring more harms than benets. On the other
hand, delaying nancial openness until the country meets these conditions could lead it to
miss some opportunities to develop. An oriented, selective and progressive capital account
opening, with priority given to help the country satisfy the aforementioned economic and
social conditions, would help it to nd the path to growth. However, as highlighted by
many authors, the conditions for IFI to be successful are fundamentally the same as the
ones needed to promote growth in general.
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A Data appendix
Table A.1: Country sample
Industrial (23) Emerging (20) Other developing economies (37)
Australia AUS Argentina ARG Bangladesh BGD
Austria AUT Brazil BRA Bolivia BOL
Canada CAN Chile CHL Botswana BWA
Switzerland CHE China CHN Cameroon CMR
Germany DEU Cte d'Ivoire CIV Congo COG
Denmark DNK Colombia COL Costa Rica CRI
Spain ESP Ecuador ECU Dominican Republic DOM
Finland FIN Greece GRC Egypt EGY
France FRA Korea KOR Ghana GHA
United Kingdom GBR Morocco MAR Guatemala GTM
Ireland IRL Mexico MEX Honduras HND
Iceland ISL Malaysia MYS Haiti HTI
Israel ISR Panama PAN Indonesia IDN
Italy ITA Peru PER India IND
Japan JPN Philippines PHL Jamaica JAM
Malta MLT Poland POL Jordan JOR
Netherlands NLD Thailand THA Kenya KEN
Norway NOR Turkey TUR Kuwait KWT
New Zealand NZL Venezuela VEN Sri Lanka LKA
Portugal PRT South Africa ZAF Mali MLI
Singapore SGP Mozambique MOZ
Sweden SWE Niger NER
United States USA Nicaragua NIC
Pakistan PAK
Papua New Guinea PNG
Paraguay PRY
Saudi Arabia SAU
Sudan SDN
Senegal SEN
El Salvador SLV
Syria SYR
Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Tunisia TUN
Togo TGO
Tanzania TZA
Uganda UGA
Uruguay URY
Notes: The sample consists of 80 countries. We restricted the emerging group to economies included in JP
Morgan EMBI Global Index. The motivation is that developing countries considered in the EMBI Global
Portfolio are nancially more developed and integrated with international markets than the other developing
countries (see Cavanagh and Long, 1999).
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Table A.2: Variables descriptions and sources
Variable Denition Source
Growth Growth rate of PPP real GDP
per capita (calculated in loga-
rithmic terms)
Penn World Table Version 6.3
Initial Income Logarithm of real per capita
GDP lagged one period
PWT
Human capital Logarithm of average years of
secondary in the population
over age 15, lagged one period
Barro and Lee (2010)
Investment rate Investment to GDP ratio PWT
Population growth Annual growth rate of popula-
tion calculated in logarithmic
terms
World Development Indicators
(WDI)
Government expenditure Government spending as a
share of GDP
PWT
Ination Logarithmic rst dierence of
Consumer Price Index
International Financial Statis-
tics (IFS)
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports to
GDP
PWT
Institutions Composite index of the ve po-
litical risk components: cor-
ruption, law & order, qual-
ity of the bureaucracy, demo-
cratic accountability, socioeco-
nomic conditions.
International Country Risk
Guide
Private credit Domestic credit to private sec-
tor to GDP
WDI
Total stocks Total stocks of external assets
and liabilities, divided by GDP
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Total liabilities Stock of external liabilities, di-
vided by GDP
idem
FDI and portfolio liabilities Stock of external FDI and port-
folio equity liabilities, divided
by GDP
idem
Debt liabilities Stock of external debt liabili-
ties, divided by GDP
idem
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Table A.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Number
Total stocks
Whole sample 1.763 1.439 0.403 8.718 80
Industrial countries 2.869 1.984 1.076 8.718 23
Emerging countries 1.265 0.936 0.555 4.947 20
Other developing countries 1.345 0.757 0.403 4.11 37
Total liabilities
Whole sample 1.085 0.752 0.265 4.507 80
Industrial countries 1.482 0.91 0.429 4.507 23
Emerging countries 0.855 0.566 0.265 2.923 20
Other developing countries 0.964 0.648 0.301 3.765 37
FDI+PF equity
Whole sample 0.305 0.299 0.008 1.986 80
Industrial countries 0.506 0.446 0.106 1.986 23
Emerging countries 0.25 0.145 0.088 0.557 20
Other developing countries 0.209 0.164 0.008 0.803 37
Debt liabilities
Whole sample 0.776 0.566 0.125 3.528 80
Industrial countries 0.962 0.523 0.322 2.51 23
Emerging countries 0.604 0.489 0.125 2.391 20
Other developing countries 0.754 0.608 0.142 3.528 37
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Figure A.1: Percentage of observations above threshold by year
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